"We were always lookin' for this guy named Charlie" -Tom Hanks, Forrest Gump
Introduction: Springtime for Kissinger
Most Americans wanted to end their country's involvement in South Vietnam by 1972, and their government was listening. By the beginning of the year, a little over a hundred thousand American soldiers remained "in country," a far cry from the more than half-million that had sustained the country at the beginning of the Nixon presidency. final massive bombing campaign to prod the North Vietnamese to accept a settlement, which they did, in eleven days. The terms of this settlement were so deeply flawed that the North Vietnamese were able to overrun South Vietnam a mere two years after the ink on the peace treaty had dried. There is no doubt that the bombings affected the North Vietnamese, but this peace did not reflect a victory for American airpower. For the United States, the 1973 Paris Peace Accords reflected the limit of airpower by itself to defeat a motivated enemy with simple equipment.
The Primacy of Airpower
Even before World War II was brought to a close by the awesome power of atomic weapons dropped from strategic bombers, advocates for airpower were already pushing the military establishment to expand the role of airpower in the armed forces of the United States. In 1925, the man who directed the biggest air campaign of the first World War, Billy Mitchell, was court martialed after making a statement calling his superiors in the War Department "incompetent", in response to the crash of an Army dirigible over Ohio. He was subsequently convicted and forced to retire. Mitchell was one of the few theorists during the interwar period who believed airpower could be best employed striking strategic targets behind enemy lines. During World War II it was believed that airpower was a decisive instrument in the conduct of the war. Indeed, airpower saved England during the Battle of Britain, but it was from an industrialized enemy who also employed airpower to a significant degree.
Two theories existed for the use of strategic airpower. The primary one was that airpower could be used to destroy the means of production, thus bringing the industrial underpinnings needed to sustain a modern war grinding to a halt. 4 A lesser known idea was that the objective of strategic airpower was to break the will of the people. This was accomplished by the bombing of cities resulting in high casualties. This was also intended to break the will of the government, by convincing it that they it not defend its people. However, even with the day and night bombing campaign carried out by the allies from 1942, the German economy continued to grow until late 1944, due to efforts to increase efficiency in the production apparatus. It is clear that the bombing campaign of
Germany affected the will of the people and German industrial capacity, but it was not decisive in ending the war. The spirit of the German people, combined with the ruthlessness of the Nazi regime, enabled Germany to fight until the bitter end. 5 The strategic bombing campaign against Japan had the undertones of an unspoken third theory of strategic bombing, extermination. Noting how ineffective high-explosive ordinance was against Japanese cities, the commander of the Twenty-First Bomber Group, Gen. Curtis LeMay, resorted to low level incendiary attacks at night against Japanese cities. These attacks resulted in massive casualties among the Japanese civilian population. One attack in Tokyo alone produced a firestorm which destroyed sixteen square miles of the city, and killed 83,000. 6 Even the nuclear attacks on Nagasaki and Hiroshima seemed to carry the message to the Japanese government that a failure to surrender would result in further atomic strikes against the Japanese mainland.
After World War II airpower advocates were convinced that Allied air supremacy had won the war. The U.S. government recognized this to some extent when it made the Air Force independent of the Army by way of the National Security Act of 1947. The same year, a dispute over funding between the Air Force and the Navy led to the "Revolt of the Admirals." The Air Force argued passionately that it was the principal deterrent for America's main enemy, the Soviet Union. It was also America's means of striking back at the enemy should a nuclear attack occur . The National Security Act of 1947 made the national defense structure such that the main rivals for any of the branches of the armed forces were the other services. The services were constantly at odds with each other for funding, resources, and missions. However, the Air Force was dominating the debate and retained the biggest share of the defense budget. to engage in any level of conflict ranging from a low-level insurgency to a nuclear war.
Limited War for Limited Objectives
Another thinker whose work would be influential to the leaders who would later develop the nation's policy towards Vietnam was Robert Osgood. His 1957 classic "Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy" emphasized the notion that political objectives would determine the practical limits of war. In other words, the more total the political objectives were, the more total the war would be. Henry Kissinger, who at this time was a lecturer at Harvard University, offered his own theory of limited war. In his view, the limited use of nuclear arms could achieve a favorable decision without expanding the conflict towards total war. Only one scholar, Thomas Schelling, even tried to develop a framework for terminating a limited conflict. 9 The problem with the theory of limited war was that it went against traditional American beliefs about the conduct of war. Americans viewed war as an aberration that should be resolved as quickly as possible, using the maximum amount of force possible. Nixon was willing to risk a global war for South Vietnam. 16 McNamara described the nation's Vietnam policy as being akin to "holding a map with only one road on it." 17 For the U.S. Army, this was a road to a protracted war of defensive attrition that was to last for 10 years.
According to Clausewitz, the defensive is the strongest form of war, but a American warplanes, and moved supplies at non-peak hours. Responding to this, the Air Force dropped sensors in the area that detected movement, and fed back the information to headquarters. The Vietnamese quickly learned how they worked, and even used them as decoys to draw American attention away from the actual materiel moving down the trail. 28 Needless to say, this exercise in frustration made the American people and military clamor for a change in the way things were run.
Nixon's Plan for Victory
In his 1968 campaign for the presidency, Richard Milhouse Nixon had promised to bring the Vietnam conflict to a close with a secret plan, a charge that he later denied.
In any case, secret or not, Nixon's plan allowed him to put some political distance Thieu made the most of the opportunity and put captured NVA T-54 tanks on display in
Saigon. The capacity of the North Vietnamese to make conventional war was greatly diminished and it was estimated that they would not be able to undertake a major offensive for three years. 45 The 
The Paris Peace Talks, Summer-Fall 1972
The United States had unilaterally withdrawn from the Paris peace talks shortly after the start of the Easter Offensive. In July 1972, with the war again in stalemate, both sides agreed to come back to the conference table to attempt to end the war on favorable terms. For the North Vietnamese their ploy to negotiate the settlement on the battlefield had failed, and China and the Soviet Union were pressuring the North Vietnamese government to accept a settlement so they could pursue their own objective of detente with the west. The pressure was also on for the United States to achieve a settlement.
Although the Linebacker I campaign enjoyed popular domestic support, contrary to the dire predictions of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Nixon's base of support among the "silent majority" was growing increasingly tenuous. 
Linebacker II
Nixon was furious at the North Vietnamese, who had reneged on concessions made in October, and at Kissinger, whom he believed was trying to embarrass him so as to garner more prestige for himself. Kissinger had declared that "peace is at hand" at a alike. 59 Members of Congress were aghast, questioning the sanity of the President.
Against that kind of domestic pressure, it was unlikely that a further escalation of the war was going to pass Congressional scrutiny once Congress resumed in January 1973.
An academic view of the reasoning behind the North Vietnamese decision to return to the talks in Paris is provided by Stanley Karnow, who wrote one of the first complete accounts of the war. In his view, after Hanoi realized that it could not dictate the terms of the peace, it still had several options available. First, no matter how intense the bombing became, they could return to the guerilla-style war they had fought in the sixties, and simply wait for American war-weariness to necessitate a withdrawal. Or, they could compromise from their earlier positions temporarily, and drop their insistence on the ouster of President Thieu, thus getting American troops removed from South
Vietnam as soon as possible. The compromise position was adopted before Linebacker II, and the bombings did not extract further compromises. 60 Airpower advocates, such as Air Force General T. R. Milton, believed that Linebacker was a model for how an air war should be conducted, brief and intense, and that it was in fact proof that airpower had won the war. Some even believed that had Operation Rolling Thunder been conducted like Linebacker, the United States could have achieved its objectives solely through the use of airpower. 61 This theory doesn't take into account that when Rolling Thunder started, North Vietnam still enjoyed the firm support of its allies. Second, in 1972 North Vietnam relied primarily on conventional forces such as tanks and heavy artillery that are far more vulnerable to air interdiction than the guerrilla forces that it had relied on throughout the sixties.
The problem with airpower as used in Linebacker, and to a lesser extent the entire Vietnam War, was that it was not used as part of a united combined-arms operation with a coherent plan to win the war. To a great degree, the Air Force might as well have been fighting its own war on another planet. In this light, Linebacker can be viewed as a last ditch plan to win the war through airpower, a Hail Mary pass to a far off end zone. In his memoirs, Kissinger even lamented that Linebacker was Nixon's "last roll of the dice. 62 If anything, Linebacker proved the decisiveness of airpower on the tactical and operational levels of war. Air strikes were instrumental in saving South Vietnam during the Easter
Offensive, but far from decisive in securing a long term peace. Linebacker also showed the inadequacies of a strategy that measured progress in terms of the amount of ordnance dropped. Nearly seven million tons of explosives alone could not break the will of North
Vietnam.
The Peace Accords that were agreed upon by the United States and North
Vietnam, hardly two weeks after the last Linebacker bomb fell, were aside from minor changes in language and translation, the same as the agreement that Nixon had axed in
October. The only reason that the deal had fallen through was Nixon's unwillingness to enter into a settlement without the support of the South Vietnamese. To get Thieu to accept the treaty, he had to threaten to cut off all aid to South Vietnam. 63 The net effect of the Linebacker campaigns, in the short term, was that the North Vietnamese were compelled to negotiate seriously with the United States for fear of a further escalation of bombing. But in the long term, airpower had failed to deliver the intended message to North Vietnam. Their national will was not broken, and two years after the peace was signed, they achieved the victory that they had sought for so long.
